An untraceable, universally verifiable voting scheme

Seminar in Cryptology
Professor Philip Klein
December 12, 1995

Abstract

Recent electronic voting schemes have shown the ability to protect the privacy of voters and prevent the possibility of a voter from being coerced to reveal his vote. These schemes protect the voter’s identity from the vote, but do not do so unconditionally. In this paper we apply a technique called blinded signatures to a voter’s ballot so that it is impossible for anyone to trace the ballot back to the voter. We achieve the desired properties of privacy, universal verifiability, convenience and untraceability at the expense of receipt-freeness.

Full text: voting.pdf (Adobe Acrobat PDF, 47K)

xmsg

xmsg uses Tk/Tcl and Sun RPC to pop up windows of text to a remote user. It is loosely based on the old cs project xmesg, which required you to munge with your xhost. xmsg instead uses a client-server paradigm to avoid security holes.

Unfortunately, before I could finish xmsg, the cs dept. discovered zephyr (a project at MIT), which is much better than xmsg could ever be. Thus, I never finished the project.

source (gzip’d tarfile).